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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the course of the 1990s, the European Union
(EU) embarked on an ambitious regulatory
reform programme for a number of
European network industries, such as
telecommunications, energy and transport. The
importance attached to network industries
within the overall Lisbon reform process stems
from the very substantial potential economic
benefits if reforms in these sectors are
successful. First, network industries are a
sizeable part of the overall economy. Taken
together, these sectors represent around 10%
(9%) of EU15 (euro area) production and
almost 7% of overall EU15 and euro area
employment. Furthermore, they also represent
around 7% of the EU15 and euro area HICP
baskets. Second, besides their actual economic
weight, they provide important inputs for a
wide range of economic sectors, which further
increases their economic importance. The
economic implications of the regulatory reform
process in these industries are therefore of
considerable importance for the ECB. Against
this background, this Occasional Paper
analyses the economic impact of the regulatory
reform programmes currently under way in
selected EU network industries, with a
particular focus on the analysis of regulatory
reforms’ price effects.
The paper first provides a review of the existing
empirical literature on regulatory reforms in
network industries. Starting with the economic
rationale for reforming regulatory
arrangements in these sectors, it reviews
existing empirical evidence with regard to both
the sector-specific and the economy-wide
economic effects of such reforms. Economy-
wide effects of regulatory reforms, especially
in terms of price level reductions and
(temporary) downward effects on inflation are
particularly relevant for the conduct of
monetary policy. Even if the magnitude of the
effects differs significantly across countries
and industries and depends crucially on the
type of regulatory changes introduced, a
common pattern of empirical results emerges.
Increased competition (either in terms of
liberalisation, privatisation, unbundling, etc.)
is generally associated with lower price levels,
expanded output and labour productivity gains.
However, regulatory reforms do have some
short-term costs, mainly in the form of initial
employment losses. The ultimate impact on
sector and aggregate employment depends on
the labour market’s capacity to adjust to a
changing economic situation. The quality of
services provided and the extent of R&D and
innovation expenditures appear also to be
positively linked to regulatory reforms. All in
all, the empirical results in the literature tend to
confirm that regulatory reforms in network
industries enhance consumers’ welfare.
The paper subsequently reviews the evolution
of the current regulatory framework for
network industries in the EU and discusses to
what extent the legal preconditions for
competition have been introduced in the
telecommunications, electricity, gas and air
transport sectors. This paper reviews also
progress with the state of regulation in railway
transport and postal services, where reforms
are not as advanced yet. The paper also
provides some indications regarding the actual
level of competition that has so far been
achieved in these sectors. We find that from a
legal point of view, most of these industries are
now fully or largely subject to competition.
With regard to telecommunications, regulators
are gradually adapting the current regulatory
framework to the new business environment by
lessening regulation where competition has
emerged and strengthening it where
incumbents still retain a dominant position.
The regulatory reform process in EU energy
markets, however, is still incomplete. First, the
legal market opening process will not be
completed until 2007. Second, many Member
States’ current regulatory framework still
appears to be insufficient to ensure a high level
of actual competition in legally open markets.
The postal sector and the rail transport industry
are in even earlier stages of the regulatory
reform process than the EU energy markets. By
contrast, the provision of air transport services5
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in the EU is almost fully liberalised, although
the remaining competition bottlenecks in some
segments of the airline industry clearly need to
be addressed. Effective competition has also
increased, but a closer look at the
implementation of the various regulatory
reforms shows that there are still a number of
unresolved issues at both the national and EU
levels. Generally speaking, the experience of
EU network industries demonstrates that  an
appropriate regulatory framework is
indispensable in order to create de facto
competition in these sectors, even after markets
have become legally open. In other words, the
‘quality’ of the regulatory framework has a
considerable impact on the extent to which
regulatory reforms in network industries will
result in lower prices and other positive
economic effects.
The final chapter of this paper examines recent
price developments in the telecommunications,
electricity, gas and air transport sectors and
provides an empirical analysis of their main
determinants. In this context particular
emphasis is given to the impact of regulatory
reform variables. We find that recent changes
in the HICP sub-indices for electricity and
telecommunications relative to the
developments in the overall HICP clearly
suggest that the introduction of competition in
these sectors led to significant relative price
falls. Panel data estimations provide additional
evidence that regulatory reform measures
had a substantial downward impact on prices
in the four sectors under review. In
telecommunications, and to a lesser extent in
the gas sector, different explanatory variables
that were used to capture the impact of
regulatory reforms on prices turn out to be
significant. With regard to the electricity
sector, regulatory reform measures appear to
have a strong significant impact on prices for
industrial electricity users and large
households. For air transport, the analysis
conducted in the paper shows an increase in the
number of international routes operated within
the EU and suggests that prices of promotional
and economy class tickets have fallen due to
regulatory reforms and the resulting increase in
competition. Prices for business class tickets,
however, have tended to increase since the start
of liberalisation, most likely due to a
rebalancing of ticket prices across different
segments of the market. On the basis of these
empirical results it is estimated that further
progress with regulatory reforms in
telecommunications, gas and electricity,
together with some degree of input price
convergence, would result in further
substantial price falls in EU network industries
of up to 36%.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the course of the 1990s, the European Union
(EU) embarked on an ambitious regulatory
reform programme for a number of
European network industries, such as
telecommunications, energy and transport.1 All
these sectors are characterised by the presence
of a bottleneck infrastructure with natural
monopoly characteristics, which makes it
difficult to introduce and safeguard
competition in these industries.2 However,
further progress with regulatory reforms in
these sectors designed to enhance the level of
competition is an important part of the Lisbon
agenda for economic reform launched by the
European Council in 2000.3 The importance
attached to network industries within the
overall Lisbon reform process stems from the
fact that the potential benefits of successful
reforms in these sectors are very substantial.
This is due to two reasons. First, network
industries are a sizeable part of the overall
economy. Taken together, these sectors
represent around 10% (9%) of EU15 (euro area)
production and almost 7% of overall EU15 and
euro area employment. Furthermore, they
represent around 7% of the EU15 and euro area
HICP baskets (see Section 2.1). Second,
besides their actual economic weight, it is a
common feature of network industries that they
provide important inputs for a wide range of
economic sectors, which further increases their
economic importance. The economic
implications of the regulatory reform process
in these industries are therefore also of
considerable importance for the ECB.4
Against this background, this Occasional Paper
analyses the economic impact of the regulatory
reform programmes currently under way in
selected EU network industries. The analysis
focuses on the price effects of regulatory
reforms in the telecommunications, electricity,
gas and air transport sectors. Furthermore, this
paper reviews progress with the state of
regulation in a number of other network
industries, namely railway transport and postal
1 “Regulatory reform” refers to changes that improve the
regulatory quality, that is, enhance the performance, cost-
effectiveness or legal quality of regulations and related
government formalities. Reform can mean the revision of a
single regulation, the scrapping and rebuilding of an entire
regulatory regime and its institutions, or the improvement of
processes for making regulations and managing reform.
“Deregulation”, or “liberalisation”, is a sub-set of regulatory
reform and refers to the complete or partial elimination of
regulation in a sector in order to improve its performance.
With regard to network industries, the aim of deregulation, or
liberalisation, is to enhance competition at least in those parts
of the industry that are not natural monopolies (OECD 1997a,
Synthesis p. 11).
2 For a brief description of the key features of network
industries see the beginning of Chapter 3.
3 See ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Lisbon European
Council March 2000.
4 The ECB published a first assessment of price effects of
regulatory reforms in selected network industries in March
2001 (ECB 2001).
5 Other network industries, such as the securities clearing and
settlement industry and the credit cards and other electronic
means of payment industry, are currently in the forefront of
regulatory reforms. However, given the specific nature of
these industries and in order to keep this occasional paper
manageable in terms of length and amount of information
provided to the reader, we did not include these industries in
our analysis.
6 Due to data availability the focus of this Occasional Paper is
on developments in the 15 EU Member States prior to EU
enlargement on 1 May 2004.
services, where reforms are not as advanced
yet.5, 6
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2
provides a review of the existing empirical
literature on regulatory reforms in network
industries. Starting with the economic
rationale for reforming regulatory
arrangements in these sectors, the chapter
reviews existing empirical evidence with
regard to both the sector-specific and the
economy-wide economic effects of such
reforms.
Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of the current
regulatory framework for network industries in
the EU and discusses to what extent the legal
preconditions for competition in these sectors
have been introduced. Furthermore, it provides
some indications regarding the actual level of
competition that has so far been achieved in
these sectors. This is of particular importance
given the fact that the de jure and de facto7
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1 INTRODUCTION
levels of competition can differ significantly
across sectors and countries, with the de facto
level of competition being of crucial
importance for the realisation of the potential
benefits of regulatory reforms.7
Chapter 4 examines recent price developments
in the four selected sectors. Furthermore, this
chapter provides an empirical analysis of the
main determinants of recent price
developments in these industries. In this
context particular emphasis is given to the
impact of regulatory reform variables. Chapter
5 summarises the main conclusions.
7 A market can be characterised by de facto or de jure
competition. De facto competition implies effective
competition in the market, whilst de jure competition is a
situation where the existing regulatory framework allows
market entry and exit, but a limited number of large players
still retains a dominant position.8
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2 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATORY
REFORMS IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
This section first presents the economic
rationale underpinning the regulatory reforms
in network industries, mainly focusing on the
sector and economy-wide impact on consumer
prices (section 2.1). Section 2.2 presents an
overview of recent literature dealing with both
the  sector-specific effects of regulatory
reforms (section 2.2.1) and the economy-wide
effects of reforms in these sectors (section
2.2.2). A summary of the surveyed literature is
provided in Table 3 at the end of this chapter.
2.1 ECONOMIC RATIONALE
Regulatory reforms in network industries are
an important element of the overall structural
reform agenda in the EU. Given that the
network industries examined in this study
account for almost 10% (9%) of the EU15 (euro
area) production, almost 7% of EU15 and euro
area employment and almost 7% of EU15 and
euro area HICP, the direct macroeconomic
impact of regulatory changes in network
industries is indeed important (see Table 1 and
Table 2 below)8.
Looking at sector-specific effects, changes in
the regulatory regime of a specific sector are
likely to have both supply- and demand-side
effects. As an example, supply-side effects can
stem from opening up the bottleneck
infrastructure of a regulated network industry
to new entrants that are allowed to provide
services or introduce new products, thereby
boosting supply. By the same token, the
consumption of network industry products may
increase as a consequence of a market being
opened to competition and the associated
expected reduction in consumer prices, the
direct consumer price effect (see Chart 1 for an
illustration). This effect is expected to persist
until the industry has reached a new steady
state. The transitory period is likely to differ
across countries and industries and depends on
the type of regulatory changes introduced. It is,
however, likely that reaching a new steady




telefax Postal transport transport
HICP-weights (total = 100) Gas Electricity services services by air by railway Total
EU-15 1.3 1.9 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 6.7
Euro area 1.3 2.0 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.4 6.8
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
Table 1 Weights of selected network industries in total HICP in 2004
Electricity, gas Transport, Total Electricity, gas Transport, Total
and water storage and and water storage and
supply communication supply communication
% of total production % of total employment
EU-15 2.1 7.7 9.8 0.7 5.9 6.6
Euro area 2.2 6.8 8.9 0.7 5.7 6.4
Source: STAN database and own calculations. Data for Ireland are not available.
1) 1999 data had to be used to compute the EU-15 average due to missing data for some countries after this date.
Table 2 Weights of selected network industries in production and employment in 1999 1)
8 To compute the weight in total production and employment,
we have proxied network industries with the sum of the
electricity, gas and water supply sector and the transport,
storage and communication sector available in the STAN
database.9
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The above-mentioned sector specific changes
are also expected to affect the economy as a
whole. In particular, direct price effects for
network products will also affect prices in
other sectors where such products are used as
input (direct producer price effects) triggering
both  indirect consumer and producer price
effects. Direct and indirect changes in
consumer prices will affect wages, employment
and productivity throughout the economy
which in turn may result in second-round price
effects. In particular, regulatory reforms have
direct and indirect impacts on productivity9.
Direct impacts occur through the decrease in
costs of doing business and through the
removal of barriers to entry into new markets.
Indirect effects operate through three main
channels, namely a reduction of sector mark-
ups and a reallocation of scarce resources
(allocative efficiency); an improvement in the
utilisation of the production factors by firms
(productive efficiency); and an incentive for
firms to innovate and to move to the modern
technology frontier (dynamic efficiency).
From a monetary policy viewpoint assessing
the timing and extent of price effects is
particularly important. Moreover, it is
fundamental to account for both direct and

















Chart  1  Price effects of regulatory reforms in network industries
and to account for changes in employment and
output growth. In the long-run, changes in
supply and demand conditions are also
expected to affect the readjustment of relative
prices in the economy, i.e. the prices of
network products relative to the prices of other
goods and services. Given that changes in the
overall price level are fundamentally
determined by monetary policy, changes in
relative prices stemming from changes in the
regulatory framework are expected to be the
only permanent long-run effect on prices.
However, from a monetary policy perspective,
the following long-term considerations should
also be taken into account.
– With regard to telecommunications in
particular, regulatory reforms and the
associated increase in the level of
competition may accelerate technological
progress. This is regarded as an important
prerequisite for the emergence of an
economic environment that would sustain
higher rates of economic growth, higher
real wage increases and lower levels of
unemployment without increased risks to
price stability.
9 For an extensive discussion of the link between product markets
reforms and productivity see European Commission (2004a).
Source: ECB (2001).10
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– If markets were to become more efficient as
a result of regulatory reforms and price
adjustments were to be carried out more
swiftly, the adjustment costs associated
with monetary policy measures may be
reduced. This would make it easier for the
ECB to conduct stability-oriented monetary
policy.
– Regulatory reforms are likely to lessen the
influence of administered prices. Price
changes in network industries will thus
presumably become more closely related to
market dynamics. However, it is not clear
whether this will significantly reduce or
increase the variability of the inflation rate
of utility prices. On the one hand, changes
in administered prices tend to be more
abrupt than price changes based on market
dynamics. On the other hand, in the past
administered utility prices were often kept
“artificially” stable for political reasons
and they may become more volatile in
future.
Against this background, it is advisable for
monetary policy-makers to monitor closely the
ongoing reforms in network industries and to
assess the economic impact of the reform steps
that have been undertaken so far.
2.2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW
2.2.1 SECTOR-SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NETWORK
INDUSTRIES
This section provides an overview of the most
recent empirical literature regarding sector
specific effects of regulatory reforms in
telecommunications, electricity, gas, air
transport services, railway transport and postal
services (see Table 3 for a summary overview).
Before turning to more industry- and/or
country-specific studies, we first start by
surveying a fundamental contribution to the
literature on network industries, namely the
OECD (1997) Report on Regulatory reforms.10
This report relies on a benchmarking technique
to estimate the long-term impacts of
liberalisation in different industries. The report
covers 8 OECD countries: United States,
Japan, Germany, Spain, France, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Cross-
country differences in productivity, consumer
prices11 and profit margins are assumed to be
partly related to differences in national
regulatory regimes. Potential gains from
regulatory reforms are then estimated by
comparing national performance with optimum
performance within the country group. The
report concludes that in the long run consumer
prices for telecommunication services are
expected to decline by an average of 13% in the
UK, more than 22% in Spain and Germany and
30% in France, due to lower costs of material
inputs and lower mark-ups. In the long run
liberalisation is estimated to boost sector
telecommunication output by between 22% and
50% taking innovation-induced changes in
telecommunications into account. With regard
to  employment, the findings by the OECD
support the commonly held view that
liberalisation is likely to have adverse
employment effects in the short run. After
several years of adjustment, however, sector
employment will eventually rise in most
countries12. The claim of improved
productivity due to increased competition
receives tentative support from the US
experience (OECD 1997, pp. 25-6, 344-5). The
relationship between liberalisation of
telecommunications and quality has been
explored less extensively, partly due to
measurement problems. Nonetheless, the
OECD (1997, pp. 25, 80, 82) finds that in the
US, liberalisation of telecommunications has
improved service quality since the inception of
reforms in the early 1980s, particularly in the
10 Another important contribution to the discussion is European
Commission (1999), which provides a very useful overview of
the regulatory and policy issues relating to regulatory reforms
in network industries. However, it does not contain detailed
empirical assessments of the economic implications of this
reform process.
11 Defined as output prices.
12 Blöndal and Pilat (1997) confirm these findings. See also EC
(1997).11
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market segment of large business consumers
where competition is most intense.13
Regarding electricity, the OECD (1997, p. 36)
estimates that consumer prices will drop by 11-
15% in Germany, France and the UK14 in the
long run due to national deregulation and
liberalisation programmes. These numbers are
supported by more recent studies on the
Netherlands.15 In the countries examined,
lower prices are estimated to boost long-term
sector electricity output by between 4.5% and
11%. It should be noted that for the electricity
sector, the OECD sees a fall in employment as
very likely even in the long run due to strong
productivity growth, whereas
telecommunications sector employment is
predicted to rebound and even increase
considerably after initial job losses. More
specifically, the report predicts that
employment will in the long run decrease by
between 9% and 46%.
Telecommunications
Prices and costs
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) examine the
effects of liberalisation and privatisation in
telecommunications on prices, taking into
account the differences in the regulatory
regimes across 23 OECD countries from 1991
to 1997. They find strong empirical evidence
that the level of competition is negatively
related to consumer prices. By contrast, the
effects of public ownership and prospective
privatisation on prices are found to be
negligible. This leads the authors to conclude
that it is not ownership per se, but the presence
of market power, which affects market
outcomes.
Output and Investment
Gruber and Verboven (2000) use a large data
set comprising 140 countries that adopted
mobile telecommunications during the period
1981-97 and find that the promotion of
competition by introduction of second entry
licences has a positive impact on the diffusion
of mobile services and, in turn, on sector
output. Simulating a dynamic model using US
13 These results are supported by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000,
pp. 18-9, 21, 39, 53-4), who find a highly significant positive
correlation between liberalisation and service quality, proxied
by various indicators such as the number of faults per mainline
and fault clearance rates.
14 For the UK, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) provide a more detailed
estimate of the economic, environmental and social effects of
electricity sector reform. They estimate permanent net cost
reductions of 5% p.a. and net benefits of 4.1-11.9 billion.
15 OECD (1999a), p. 28, 62, 238 and Haffner and van Bergeijk
(1997).
data, Clarke et al. (2004) find positive effects
of competition on telecom investment.
Productivity
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000, pp. 18, 21, 37, 53-
6) find a significant positive correlation
between liberalisation in telecommunications
and labour productivity. Duso and Röller
(2003) present empirical evidence regarding
the effect of endogenous deregulation on
productivity in the mobile telecommunication
industry in the period 1993-1997 for a panel of
OECD countries. Estimating simultaneous
equations for both deregulation and
productivity, they show that the impact of
endogenous deregulation on productivity is
positive and statistically significant, but
considerably smaller than estimates where
deregulation is considered exogenous.
Innovation
The effects of liberalisation and privatisation
on  innovation are the subject of some
controversy in the literature. On the one hand,
it can be argued that liberalisation encourages
innovation, as it increases incentives to
provide new services. On the other hand,
liberalisation entails the loss of a secure
franchise market to finance R&D investment,
which has to be taken into account in the design
of the regulatory framework for the industry
(Newbery, 1999). By and large, however, the
empirical evidence seems to favour the view
that competition acts as a spur to innovation.
Taking patents as an indicator of innovation
performance, the OECD (1997a) finds that
telecommunication patents have expanded
more strongly in countries where the industry
has been subject to stronger competition. Using
an econometric approach, van Cuilenburg and12
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Slaa (1995) conduct a cross-sectional multiple
regression analysis for 24 OECD countries
between 1989 and 1992. They also find a
positive correlation between market
liberalisation and innovations in
telecommunications. More recently, Prieger
(2002) examines the effect of regulation on
product innovations in the telecommunications
services using US company data. An interim
period of lighter regulation in the market
provides the “experimental data” to test the
regulatory regime’s impact on product
innovation. He finds that the number of
products that firms created during periods of
lighter regulation is between 60% and 100%
larger that the model would have predicted had
a stricter regulation been in place.
Electricity
Prices and costs
Empirical evidence suggests that the
liberalisation of market entry in electricity
tends to put downward pressure on prices.
However, estimating these reductions is
difficult, especially as reforms in most
countries have just started. Lijesen (2002)
calibrates a forecasting model for electricity
using data for the Netherlands.
Notwithstanding the fact that the model is
calibrated using pre-regulation data and that
the quality of some of the data used is relatively
poor, the author claims that the introduction of
competition in the retail and wholesale
electricity market reduces total costs for users.
Entry of low cost competitors and lower
switching costs for consumers are also likely to
have a downward effect on prices. An
econometric study by Steiner (2000) examines
a panel of 19 OECD countries over a 10-year
period. The author finds that the separation of
generation and transmission, the expansion of
Third Party Access16 (TPA) and the
introduction of spot markets tend to reduce
industrial and residential end-user prices of
electricity, whereas private ownership and
imminence of privatisation (in a non-
competitive environment) tend to increase
them. The latter finding could be explained by
the government’s aim of generating revenue by
privatisation, as well as persistent market
power after privatisation.
London Economics (1997) uses a simulation-
based approach to examine the cost savings to
be generated by the introduction of a single
European market for electricity. Price
reductions of 5-11% for industrial consumers
and 2-4% for residential consumers are
expected. These cost savings originate mainly
in lower construction and operating costs for
generating plants and optimal fuel choice.
Further gains can be realised by introducing
supply (retailing) competition and national
electricity pools. The authors stress that major
consumer price effects can be expected from
these additional measures, but do not attempt to
quantify them in this study, as they were not
compulsory elements of the EU legal
framework for the electricity sector when this
study was prepared.
Efficiency
Steiner (2000) investigates the effects of
liberalisation and privatisation on efficiency.
Two indicators of efficiency, the capacity
utilisation rate and reserve margins (the ability
of capacity to handle peak loads), are
separately regressed on a number of regulatory
reform variables, namely the separation of
generation and transmission, TPA and private
ownership.17 Both measures of efficiency are
positively and significantly affected by
unbundling18 and privatisation. The coefficient
16 In the electricity and gas markets, the right to access the
existing transmission and distribution network of the
incumbent operator is called third party access.
17 It should be kept in mind that reserve margins are difficult to
interpret as indicators of efficiency. Castro-Rodriguez et al.
(2001) simulate the potential welfare effects of deregulation,
focusing on the choice of capacity by firms. On the basis of
Spanish data, they find that deregulated electricity markets
will result in under-investment in generation capacity and that
the potential welfare costs are very large. Inadequate
generation capacity is generally considered to be the main
culprit behind California’s electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001,
therefore the importance of appropriate regulation in the
electricity market appears to be crucial to guarantee a
sufficient level of investment.
18 In general this is referred to as the separation of vertically-
integrated monopolies into independent entitities. More
specifically unbundling in the electricity market implies the
separation of the generation from the transmission of energy.13
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on TPA is insignificant in both regressions, a
finding that could be explained by the fact that
legal rights to TPA need not necessarily
translate into actual TPA, particularly if the
incumbent retains its dominant position.
Gas
Prices and costs
Using the methodology described above,
Lijesen (2002) shows that gas prices are likely
to decline in the Netherlands following the
introduction of competition in the retail and
wholesale markets. In the US, reform of gas
regulation has been under way since the early
1980s, such that the industry structure has
changed markedly by now, from regionalised
monopolies to competition in generation,
mandatory TPA to interstate pipelines and the
creation of spot markets. The OECD (1999b,
p.25) reports that these reforms have led to a
35% cost cut in real terms between 1984 and
1994. Prices to consumers likewise dropped,
with margins in transmission and distribution
declining by 31% between 1984 and 1993.
A study by van Oostvoorn and Boots (1999)
sets up two scenarios for the implementation of
the EU Gas Directive, respectively called the
‘full competition’ and ‘semi-open competition’
scenarios. Based on these scenarios, the
authors estimate the impacts on industry
structure and consumer prices for seven EU
countries and different consumer groups by
means of a model of the EU gas market. In the
‘full competition’ scenario, all seven EU
countries are expected to see substantial gas
price reductions between 1995 and 2010.
Prices in the residential market segment are
predicted to fall by between 15% in the
Netherlands and the UK to 40% in Italy. Price
reductions for industrial consumers are
expected to range from 8% in Belgium to 30%
in Germany. Moreover, the authors predict a
considerable rise in consumption, convergence
of consumer prices across EU countries and
between different consumer groups due to
arbitrage, and the erosion of profit margins of
national transmission companies. Under the
‘semi-open competition’ scenario, which
captures a minimalist implementation of the
Directive, only small price reductions are
predicted (but not quantified), price
differentials across countries and market
segments persist, and profit margins are
expected to remain constant or even increase
slightly.
London Economics (1997) also estimates the
gains from creating a European market for gas,
using three scenarios: ‘business-as-usual’,
‘increased competition’ and ‘open gas
markets’. They conclude that the effects of a
single gas market differ significantly from
those in electricity, due to very large
economies of scale in gas transmission,
vertical separation with oligopoly in both
production and transmission, and the location
of major gas producers outside the EU. For
these reasons, expected gains to European gas
consumers as expressed by lower consumer
prices are much smaller than in electricity.
Even in the most favourable scenario, based on
the assumption that consumers’ bargaining
power exceeds that of producers, the gains from
the creation of a European gas market, while
sizeable, are only one-ninth of the gains from
an integrated electricity market.
Productivity and employment
In the US, labour productivity in the gas
industry rose by 24% in the 10 years after 1984,
the beginning of US gas sector reforms. This
increase was partly due to a 13% decline in
sector employment over the same period
(OECD, 1999b, p.25). If similar figures apply
to the EU, this would imply smaller long-term
sector employment losses and smaller
productivity gains than in the electricity sector.
Air transport
Prices and costs
Several studies have documented the benefits
in terms of lower prices stemming from
opening up the airline industries. The
experience in the US is broadly positive
(Morrison and Winston, 1995). Between 1976
and 1993, prices fell by one-third relative to the
average price level, with almost 60% of the14
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decline attributed to deregulation (Blöndal and
Pilat, 1997). Blöndal and Pilat (1997) also
estimate the sector impact of regulatory
reforms in air transport in the US, UK, Japan,
Germany and France. They find that for Japan,
Germany and France, the impact of regulatory
reforms on price levels would be quite
substantial, ranging from –10% in Japan to –
6% in Germany and France.
Gonec and Nicoletti (2000) develop a panel of
27 OECD countries focusing on the 1996-1997
travel season. Estimating cross-country and
cross-route regressions, they show that fares
tend to decline when regulation and market
structure become more competitive. However,
they conclude that in 1996-97 few international
routes were truly open to competition and that a
few incumbent flag-carriers or alliances among
incumbent airlines tended to dominate most
markets. They find some evidence that
economy and (to a lesser extent) business fares
are higher for routes dominated by airline
alliances and are particularly sensitive to
pricing regulations. Discount fares are found to
be mainly affected by charter regulations and
by the presence of challenger airlines.
Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) apply a cross-
section regression to routes originating from
Atlanta and find that the fares for routes served
by a low-cost carrier were on average 16
percent lower than on routes where such
competition was absent. Ng and Seabright
(2001) consider a panel of twelve European and
seven major US airlines and find that state
ownership has a large upward impact on firms’
costs. They find that deregulation measures
have had a fairly limited on European carriers
overall and estimate that the potential benefits
of increased competition, especially if
accompanied by further privatisation, could be
substantial, ranging between 15% and 20% of
firms’ total costs.
Output and employment
According to Blöndal and Pilat (1997), price
reductions stemming from regulatory reforms
would substantially increase passenger traffic.
Taking into account the sector innovative
effects of regulatory reforms, estimated output
increases would range from 14% in Germany
and France to almost 20% in Japan. Some
employment losses are expected in the short
run (especially in Japan and France), whilst
long-run effects on employment are
ambiguous, as employment growth induced by
new entrants might compensate for
employment losses at incumbent companies.
Efficiency and quality
The effects of deregulation on efficiency are
not unambiguous. Gonec and Nicoletti (2000)
find that overall efficiency and the rate of
occupancy of aircraft seats tend to increase as
the regulatory environment becomes more
competitive. Liu and Lynk (1999) find that US
deregulation did not induce efficiency
convergence amongst carriers and that
opportunities to exercise market power via
predatory practices are still relatively common
and tend to signal limited effective competition
in the market. Gagnepain and Marín (2004)
find that the 1992 European deregulation
package significantly improved European
airlines’ efficiency.
Mazzeo (2003) uses US data for the year 2000
to investigate the link between service quality
(in terms of flight delays) and the extent of
market power. Controlling for other factors
such as weather conditions and airport
congestion, he finds that flights are less
frequently on time on routes that are served by
only one airline and in cases when the carrier’s
market share at the airports served is higher.
Railway transport
The US experience in railway deregulation,
which started in 1980, suggests that a reduction
of the regulatory burden for rail transport can
result in considerable productivity gains and
lower prices. However, it should be kept in
mind that the US experience with regulatory
reforms in the railway sector is only partly
comparable to the reform model envisaged in
the EU. First, railways in the US focus almost
exclusively on freight rather than passenger15
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traffic. Second, US railways own their
infrastructure and a separation of tracks and
services is not envisaged.19 Grimm and
Winston (2000) explore the effect of
competition on rates and service quality in the
US railway sector. Using survey data, they find
that increased rail competition lowers transport
rates but in general does not improve service
quality in terms of times.
Affuso and Newbery (2002) investigate
whether vertical separation and auctions of
short duration contracts depressed investment
in the British passenger railway industry.
Notwithstanding the limited size of the panel
examined, they find preliminary evidence
contrary to this prediction and conclude that a
higher degree of competition induced by
relatively frequent auction of the franchisees
tends to improve investment performance.
More generally, Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes
(2004) present econometric evidence for a
panel of 12 EU countries showing that the
implementation of reforms (separation
between infrastructure and operations, third-
party access and the existence of an
independent regulatory entity) had a positive
impact on (quantitative) output.
Postal services
Cohen and Chu (1997) estimate that the
introduction of a second firm sharing the US
postal delivery market with the incumbent
significantly increases the cost of delivery and
route time. However, the monopoly rents of
workers seem to outweigh the benefits of scale
in the delivery system, which would speak in
favour of more competition. The effects on
efficiency have not been analysed.
More recently, Mizutani and Uranishi (2003)
explore the parcel delivery market in Japan in
the period 1972 to 1998 using data for six
companies including the former Post Office
state monopoly. They conclude that increased
competition contributes to both cost reduction
and TFP growth for private companies, whilst
the former monopolist appears to react quite
slowly to increased competition, delivering
new strategic options and products only with a
considerable time lag.
2.2.2 ECONOMY-WIDE EFFECTS OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NETWORK
INDUSTRIES
In this section we focus on the economy-wide
effects of regulatory reforms in network
industries.
Effects on prices and inflation
The economy-wide impacts of network
industry reforms on prices and inflation are
particularly important for monetary policy
making. The OECD Report on Regulatory
Reform (OECD 1997) presents estimates of the
effects of deregulation on a variety of
macroeconomic variables, using the OECD
INTERLINK model. The first-round effects
described for different industries in section
2.2.1 are fed into the model as exogenous
changes in order to simulate all
macroeconomic responses to the shocks,
including second-round effects. According to
this study, producer prices in the long term are
predicted to fall by 0.8-0.9% for Germany,
France and the UK due to the combined effect
of deregulation in the telecommunications and
electricity industry. These estimates take into
account not only the direct producer price
effect, which derives from lower costs for
electricity and telecommunications inputs in
all sectors, but also indirect producer price
effects. The latter comprise all repercussions of
regulatory reform on producer prices as
captured by the model, including second-round
effects on wages due to reduced consumer
prices.
With the assumption that reforms are fully
implemented after a period of 10 years, the
downward pressure on prices subsides and
inflation rates return to their pre-reform level.
Thus, in the very long-run, inflation rates are
projected to be unaffected by regulatory
19 On this issue see e.g. The McKinsey Quarterly 1997, Number
4, pp. 107-119.16
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reform, whereas the price level is expected to
remain permanently lower.
Blöndal and Pilat (1997) also estimate
economy-wide first-round effects of regulatory
reforms by aggregating the specific effects of
each of the five sectors analysed (electricity,
telecommunication, air and road transport and
distribution). These five sectors account for
approximately 20% of business-sector GDP
and employment. Regulatory reforms are
estimated to have a downward effect on the
GDP deflator, ranging from –2% in Japan to
close to –1.5% in France and Germany and –
0.3% in the United States (compared with the
baseline scenario).
Effects on output, investment, employment
and productivity.
According to the OECD (1997), regulatory
reforms in the electricity and
telecommunication sectors are estimated to
have long-term employment effects ranging
from –0.28% and –0.21% respectively in
Germany and the UK, to over –0.1% in France
and Sweden, 0% in Spain, and +0.29% in the
Netherlands20.
Higher output in the telecommunications and
electricity sectors is expected to mechanically
increase total business sector output by
between 0.4% in Sweden and 1.2% in Spain
(OECD, 1997). However, the overall output
effect estimated in Blöndal and Pilat (1997)
ranges from 1% in the United States to close to
5% in Germany and France (long-run deviation
from baseline). Differences in magnitude
across countries are mainly due to the different
country-specific scopes of stimulating
efficiencies via regulatory reforms, mainly
reallocating capital and labour across
economic sectors within each country.
The projected rise in output, together with the
rather small (positive or negative) effects on
employment, is expected to spawn a substantial
increase in labour productivity growth. For
Germany and France, for instance, this increase
is estimated at 2.6% and 1.3% respectively
(OECD, 1997). A somewhat stronger positive
effect on productivity is estimated in Blöndal
and Pilat (1997). In general, they find that
benefits are larger the more regulated countries
are at the beginning of the reform process.
Alesina et al. (2005) explore the effects
of regulation on investment in a panel of
network industries (airline, railways,
telecommunication, postal services, electricity
and gas) and find that liberalising entry into
these sectors significantly boosted investment
rates (the ratio of investment to capital stock).
Reducing the extent of regulation to the level in
the US is estimated to increase average sector
investment rates by 2.6% in Germany and
France and by more than 4% in Italy. The effect
of privatisation on investment is however
ambiguous.
Easier regulation of entry into product markets
is also found to significantly boost employment
given that, as restrictions are eased and
competition increases, firms earn lower
product market rents, activity expands and
employment rates tend to rise, as documented
by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004).
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) explore the link
between multi-factor productivity (MFP)
growth and various indicators of product
market regulation and privatisation within a
panel of 18 OECD countries. They find that
countries with lower entry barriers and state
control catch up more quickly to the best-
practice technologies in manufacturing
industries and that entry liberalisation leads to
MFP gains in all countries, regardless of their
initial position with respect to the technology
frontier. Moreover, privatisation is found to
involve direct productivity gains, although the
extent of these gains depends on the promotion
of de facto competition in the market where
privatisation has taken place.
20 All figures refer to deviation from the baseline scenario over a
period of ten years.17
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Author Country/Period Method variable variable Performance Main findings
TELECOMS
Boylaud and 23 OECD countries, Econometric Liberalisation Consumer prices Negative
Nicoletti  (2000) 1991-97 Quality Positive
Labour productivity Positive
Privatisation See above Insignificant
Duso and Röller 24 OECD countries, Econometric/Single Deregulation Productivity in Positive, but
(2003) 1993-97 and simultaneous mobile smaller if
equations estimates telecommunication deregulation is
endogenous
Gruber and 140 countries, Logistic econometric Competition Diffusion of mobile Positive
Verboven (2000) 1981-97 model of diffusion (second-entry services (and sector
licences in mobile output)
telecommunication)
OECD (1997) 8 OECD countries Benchmarking Competition, DE, ES, FR, NL,
(US, JP, DE, ES, regulatory reform SE, UK
FR, NL, SE, UK) Consumer prices -13 to –30%
long-run Output +22 to +50%
Labour productivity +20 to +40%
Employment -2 to +23%
Innovation Positive




Prieger (2002) US company data, Econometric, Regulation Product innovation “Lighter”
1987-97 Generalised in mobile regulation
Poisson Models telecommunication associated with
the creation of
more products
Van Cuilenburg 24 OECD countries, Econometric Liberalisation Innovation Positive
and Slaa (1995) 1989-92
ELECTRICITY
Castro-Rodriguez Spain, 1999-2010 Econometric Regulation Investment in Deregulated
et al. (2001) (projected) model, simulation generation capacity markets resulting
(for year 2005) in under-
investment
London EU Simulation nTPA1) Cost savings €4-6 billion
Economics (1997) rTPA €10-12 billion
under the Consumer prices Down 5-11% for
implementation of industrial, down
the Single Market 2-4% for
residential
Lijesen (2002) Netherlands Econometric Competition Costs and prices Negative
model, calibration
OECD (1997) 8 OECD countries Benchmarking Competition, DE, ES, FR, NL,
(US, JP, DE, ES, regulatory reform SE, UK
FR, NL, SE, UK) Consumer prices -9 to –20%
long-run Output +5 to +11%
Labour productivity +30 to +100%
Employment -9 to –46%
Steiner (2000) 19 OECD countries Econometric TPA, unbundling Consumer prices Negative
Efficiency Positive
Privatisation As above Positive
Positive
Table 3  Overview of important sector-specific and economy-wide empirical studies
1) nTPA stands for “negotiated third party access”, i.e. the right to access the existing transmission and distribution network which
is negotiated individually for each contract rather than fixed uniformly for all contracts and competitors (so called “regulated third
party access” or rTPA).18
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 28
April 2005
Table 3  Overview of important sector-specific and economy-wide empirical studies (cont’)
Explanatory
Author Country/Period Method variable variable Performance Main findings
GAS
Lijesen (2002) As above As above As above As above As above
London EU Simulation Implementation Cost savings €256 million to
Economics (1997) of Single Market €283 million (up
through nTPA/ to €1,382 million
rTPA in most favourable
scenarios)
Consumer prices Negative
OECD (1999b) United States, Descriptive TPA, spot markets, Profit margins -31% (1984-93)
1984-1994 liberalisation Costs -35%
Labour productivity +24%
Employment -13%
Van Oostvoorn EU Simulation Scenarios for the AT, BE, DE, FR, Residential: -15
and Boots (1999) implementation of IT, NL, UK to -40%;
the Single Market Consumer prices Industrial:
for gas 0 to -30%
AIR TRANSPORT
Blöndal and Pilat US, Japan, Benchmarking Regulatory Consumer price, –10% to –6%
(1997) Germany, France reforms Output +14% to + 20%




Fisher and Atlanta airport pair Cross-section Competition Passenger fares Negative, -16%




Gonec and 27 OECD countries, Econometric Competition Passenger fares, Negative,
Nicoletti (2000) 1996-1997 Efficiency and Positive
Occupancy
Mazzeo (2003) US, 2000 Econometric Competition Quality (in terms of Positive
flight delays)
Ng and Seabright 19 airlines (both Econometric State ownership Firm’s costs Negative, further
(2001) European and US), estimation of a privatisation
1982 to 1995 carrier cost could lower costs
function up to 20%
RAILWAY TRANSPORT
Affuso and Panel of 25 UK Econometric Vertical separation Investment Frequent actions
Newbery (2002) operators, and auctions and a higher





Friebel et al. 12 EU countries, Econometric Separation between (Quantitative) Positive impact




Grimm and Panel of US Econometric Market Price Negative
Winston (2000) railways,  1998 competition Quality Not affected
POSTAL SERVICES
Cohen and Chu US Simulation Introduction of a Cost of delivery Increase
(1997) second firm significantly
(increased
competition) Monopoly rent of Reduce
postal workers considerably19
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Table 3  Overview of important sector-specific and economy-wide empirical studies (cont’)
Explanatory
Author Country/Period Method variable variable Performance Main findings
Mizutani and 6 Japanese parcel Econometric Increased Costs Negative
Uranishi (2003) delivery companies, competition TFP Positive
1972-98
ECONOMY-WIDE
Alesina et al. 21 OECD countries, Econometric, Economic Investment in Reducing
(2005) 1975-96 dynamic model Regulation in a selected network regulation spurs
panel of network industries investment, from
industries +2.6% to +4%
Blöndal and Pilat US, Japan, Aggregation of Competition and GDP deflator, -2.1% to -0.3%
(1997) Germany, France sector effects regulatory reforms Total output, +0.1% to + 0.8%
and UK Productivity. +0.5 to +3.5%
As above Simulation As OECD 1997 Comparable to Comparable to
(as  OECD 1997) OECD (1997) OECD (1997)
Nicoletti and 18 OECD Econometric Privatisation Multi-factor Positive
Scarpetta (2003) countries,1984-1998 productivity
Entry barriers/ Negative
state control
OECD (1997) 8 OECD countries Simulation Competition, DE, ES, FR, NL,
(US, JP, DE, ES, regulatory reform SE, UK
FR, NL, SE, UK) of telecoms and Producer prices -0.77 to -0.93%
long-run electricity (DE, F, UK)
Output +0.44 to +1.15%
Employment -0.28 to +0.29%
Inflation nil (very long
term)
3 RECENT PROGRESS IN REGULATORY
REFORMS IN EU NETWORK INDUSTRIES
Network industries are characterised by the
delivery of products and services to final
consumers via a “network infrastructure”
consisting of different elements linking
upstream supply with customers lying
downstream. A typical network industry has
three key components: (i) upstream core
products, (ii) network infrastructure and (iii)
downstream customer supply and service
provision (see Bergman et al., 1998, for a
discussion). Until a few years ago, network
industries in EU Member States were typically
characterised by the existence of one large,
vertically integrated (i.e. covering the different
stages of the production process mentioned
above) and publicly owned incumbent firm.
Arguably the most important reason for this
monopolistic market structure is
simultaneously the main defining feature of
network industries, namely the above-
mentioned presence of a bottleneck
infrastructure with natural monopoly
characteristics, i.e. with average costs
declining as output increases.21 Examples of
bottleneck infrastructures are transmission
networks for electricity and gas, fixed-wire
telecommunications, and rail networks. It
would be extremely expensive and
economically inefficient to duplicate these
infrastructures, for example installing
competing electricity transmission systems or
parallel rail networks.22 Furthermore,
governments frequently pursue non-economic
objectives via network industries, such as
universal service obligations for utilities and
public transport companies and equal prices
across geographic regions. Moreover, given
that network industries often provide essential
services, it is important to ensure the security
of supply. All these reasons are often seen as
justification for regulation and more direct
21 For a detailed discussion see R. B. Braeutigam (1989).
22 The capital investment required to install a network
infrastructure is also generally “sunk” or irreversible.20
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governmental interference than in other sectors
of the economy.
More recently, however, the question emerged
to what extent competition could be introduced
in network industries with a view to enhancing
their economic performance.23 The key issue in
this context is to separate the industry’s natural
monopoly element(s), usually the main
physical infrastructure(s), from elements that
do not have natural monopoly features, for
example the actual supply of services. This can
be done by granting different companies access
to the bottleneck infrastructure. More
specifically, this requires regulations in order
to ensure non-discriminatory access for
potential competitors under ‘fair’ conditions.
Moreover, if incumbent firms provide different
types of services in markets with different
levels of competition, regulation is needed to
prevent “cross-subsidisation”. A well-known
example for this practice occurred during the
initial stages of telecoms liberalisation, when
profits generated by (non-competitive) local
fixed-line calls were used to subsidise long
distance calls by the same company. This often
made it more difficult for new long distance
telecommunication service providers to enter
the latter (legally contestable) market, thus
lowering de facto competition.
As shown in more detail below, the network
industries covered in this paper are currently in
very different stages of the regulatory reform
process and the level of competition differs
significantly across sectors.
3.1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The telecommunications sector has made
significant strides towards liberalisation. As of
1  January 1998, free competition among
voice telephony and telecommunications
infrastructure providers was introduced in the
EU and by 2001 the last of old Member States’
country-specific temporary derogations from
implementing the relevant EU Directives had
expired. In March 2002, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted a new EU
framework for electronic communications
networks and services. This new framework is
a significant departure from past practice
insofar as it assumes that competition has
become the rule rather than the exception in
this sector and that sector-specific regulations
are from now on only needed in particular
areas, such as access to the fixed-line network,
rather than in the industry as a whole.
Furthermore, the new framework gives a more
important role to the National Regulatory
Authorities (NRAs), which can grant access to
networks where justified by a lack of
competitive pressure on dominant operators.24
However, there remain a number of
impediments to the de facto creation and
promotion of competition. The 8th European
Commission ‘Report on the implementation of
the telecommunications regulatory package’
stated that a number of practical
implementation issues still need to be resolved.
These include for example cumbersome
licence procedures for new service providers,
the untimely delivery of leased lines
by the incumbent operator to other
telecommunications service providers and the
cross-subsidisation by some incumbent
operators of specific services for which
competition is intense.25
Against this background, it is not surprising
that despite the advanced stage of the reform
process in telecommunications, effective
23 Technological progress and innovation have also played a role
in reducing the importance of the natural monopoly
characteristic of certain network industries such as in the
telecommunications sector.
24 For details regarding the new framework and the state of its
implementation in the EU15 see European Electronic
Communications Regulation and Markets 2003: Report on the
implementation of the EU Electronic Communications
Regulatory Package, COM(2003)715 final, 19.11.2003.
25 European telecoms regulation and markets 2002: Eighth
report on the implementation of the telecommunications
regulatory package, COM (2002) 695 final, 3 December 2002.21
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competition in a number of countries and
market segments, especially local calls and
domestic fixed-line telephony, remains
somewhat limited, with the dominant
incumbents retaining a significant market
share.
In 2002, the market share of the leading fixed-
line telephony and mobile telecommunications
operators remained above 40% of the overall
market for all four major types of
telecommunications services in all EU15
countries. The UK, with its relatively long
history of regulatory reforms in the
telecommunications markets, is the only EU15
Member State were the shares for at least two
types of services had fallen significantly below
40% by 2002 (see Chart 2).
The dominance of the incumbent operators is
strongest for local calls, for which the market
shares range from 69% (Sweden) to 100%
(Portugal).26 This reflects the regulatory
difficulties associated with securing access
rights for new telecommunications companies
to the ‘last mile’ of the fixed telephony
network. Whereas the unweighted average of
the leading providers’ market share for local
calls for all EU15 Member States was around
82% in 2002, the average market share for
domestic long distance calls was 68% and for
international calls it was 59%. The average
share for mobile calls was clearly the lowest,
with 47% of the market. Looking at
developments over time, the incumbent fixed-
line operators’ share of local and national long
distance calls declined in almost all countries,
whereas the picture is much more mixed for
international fixed-line and mobile calls.
The strong role of the incumbents in most EU
telecommunications markets illustrates the
considerable practical difficulties of ensuring
non-discriminatory access to the bottleneck
infrastructures in telecommunications.27 It is a
time-consuming process for regulators to
acquire the information needed to establish, for
example, the ‘fair’ price for leasing a telephone
line. These implementation problems, as well
as the time it takes for suppliers and consumers
to adjust to a new competitive environment,
explain why the creation of de facto
competition in network industries is usually a
gradual process.
3.2 ENERGY MARKETS
Unlike the telecommunications industry, the
EU electricity and gas markets are not yet fully
open to competition in all EU15 Member
States. This is due to the fact that the EU
Council decided to follow a gradual market
opening approach in these two network
industries.
26 Data for these two countries relate to 2001.
27 For a general discussion on the impact of different forms of
regulation in telecommunications markets on the level of
competition see de Bijl and Peitz (2002).
Chart 2 Incumbent market share in local,
long distance, international and mobile
phone calls in 2002
 (% of the total market)1
1 Data for local calls in Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Denmark and Sweden refer to 2001.
Source: Eurostat – structural indicators database.
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The 1996 EU Electricity Market Directive (96/
92/EC) called for an initial liberalisation of at
least 25% of the national electricity markets by
1999. This share was due to increase to one-
third by 2003. The 1998 EU Gas Market
Directive (98/30/EC) foresaw an initial
liberalisation of at least 20% of the national gas
markets by 2000 and of one-third of these
markets by 2008. However, an agreement to
speed up the liberalisation of the electricity and
gas sectors was reached in 2003, resulting in
new Electricity and Gas Directives.28 The
agreement sets a timetable for opening the
energy market, with a deadline of 1 July 2004
for non-household users and 1 July 2007 for
household users. Some Member States have
already gone beyond the minimum market
opening requirements in these two industries
and opened their energy markets fully to
competition. Many other Member States,
however, have so far failed to keep the schedule
for the compulsory (partial) market opening.
Although businesses were supposed to be
allowed to freely choose their suppliers of
electricity and gas from 1 July 2004, only two
EU Member States, neither of them among the
big EU economies, had fully implemented the
necessary legislation in time.29
Chart 3 shows the percentage of the electricity
and gas markets open to competition in the EU
countries in 2003.
Chart 3 Opening of the EU electricity and
gas markets in 2003
Source: European Commission (2004b). Gas market data for
Greece, Portugal and Finland are not available.
Developments since 2000 show a steady
increase in the share of the EU energy markets
that are legally open to competition.30
According to the European Commission (2004)
report on the implementation of the internal
electricity and gas market, six out of 25 EU
countries, namely Germany, Spain, Austria,
Finland, Denmark and the UK, have so far
declared their electricity and gas markets fully
open to competition. However, Greece, France
and Portugal, as well as most of the new EU
Member States, still have to open more than
50% of their electricity and gas markets to
competition. The unweighted EU25 average of
markets in these two sectors now open to
competition is 56% for electricity and 63% for
gas. The corresponding weighted average
figures, using HICP weights, are 75% for
electricity and 78% for gas.
The difference between fully and partially
liberalised markets is important for how
electricity and gas prices are likely to be
affected by regulatory reforms. Direct price
reductions for private households due to
competition can only be expected if the
electricity and gas markets for private
consumers are also open for competition.
Private households in Member States where
only non-household energy markets have been
opened to competition can therefore only
expect to benefit from energy market
liberalisation if lower electricity or gas prices
for industrial users are passed on to consumers.
However, a number of national regulatory
authorities operate price cap rules that require
electricity and gas suppliers to adjust prices for
all consumers, including private households.
Such price cap mechanisms are usually set on
the basis of, for example, developments in fuel
prices and assumed industry-wide efficiency
gains in the electricity or gas sector. Their
introduction and the resulting downward price
effects for electricity and gas consumers can be
28 Directives 2003/54 and 2002/55 respectively.
29 Financial Times, 2 July 2004, “Brussels urges EU nations to
open their energy markets”.



































interpreted as a positive consequence of the
regulatory reform process in energy markets.
As in the case of telecommunications,
regulatory reforms in the electricity and gas
sectors can only result in downward price
effects if the regulatory framework ensures de
facto competition. However, despite progress
in the formal opening of the electricity market
in many countries, actual competition remains
so far often limited.31 This is mainly due to
dominant incumbents, especially in the field of
electricity generation, lack of interconnection
of electricity networks within and between
Member States and – in some cases –
insufficiently strong NRAs. Despite recent
progress in the implementation of the gas
directive, effective competition in the gas
market is still relatively limited and even less
developed than in the electricity sector. The
main obstacles hampering competition in a
number of EU gas markets are disparities in
network access tariffs across countries and
regions, the concentration of gas production
and imports in the hands of a few companies
and the slow development of gas trading hubs.
The latter prevents potential new gas market
entrants from buying wholesale gas.
3.3 AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES
Since 1997 the regulatory framework for the
provision of air transport services within the
EU gives unrestricted access to all
international intra-EU routes and all domestic
EU markets for any carrier holding a
Community licence.32 Furthermore, the
freedom of market access is complemented by
the freedom to set fares. However, the
regulatory framework contains some
safeguards, for example public service
obligations to maintain services to peripheral
regions.33
Notwithstanding the advanced stage of the
regulatory reform process in air transport, a
number of infrastructure bottlenecks continue
to limit competition. The most important
bottleneck appears to be the scarcity of
available slots at major airports. According to
current rules, established carriers do not
normally loose their take-off and landing slots
however little they actually use them. Although
a Council Regulation adopted in October
1999)34 stipulates that 50% of unused or newly
created slots must be set aside for newcomers
to the market, the availability of peak-time
slots at congested airports did not substantially
increase. In 2001, the Commission thus set a
process in motion to help make the slot system
more flexible. In January 2004 a study looking
into mechanisms that encourage slot mobility
and lead to the most efficient use of scarce
airport capacity was completed. On the basis of
this study, the Commission will further
develop its thinking on new regulations.35
Another frequently mentioned bottleneck that
reduces competition is air space congestion. In
order to reduce this problem, the European
Parliament and the Council approved in early
2004 a package of Commission proposals that
paves the way for a single system of air traffic
control in Europe, known as the ‘Single
European Sky’, by 31 December 2004.36
31 See e.g. Speck and Mulder (2003) and ECB (2004).
32 Regulation (EEC) 2408/92.
33 Air traffic between the EU Member States and third countries
is still heavily regulated by bilateral agreements between the
individual Member States and non-EU countries. However, a
2002 European Court of Justice ruling granted the European
Commission the ability to negotiate international ‘open skies’
agreements on behalf of the EU as a whole.
34 Regulation EEC 95/93.
35 ‘Flexibility arrangements’ were introduced in the wake of the
crises which gripped the airline industry following the events
of 11 September 2001 in the US, the outbreak of SARS and the
war in Iraq in 2003. Under these arrangements, airport co-
ordinators were required to continue to allocate slots to air
carriers affected by the crisis for a certain period of time, even
if air carriers had not used them in accordance with
Community rules.
36 Until recently, ground-handling operations in many EU
airports remained also a monopoly. Many carriers complained
that these services were too expensive and acted as a
competition deterrent. However, over the last few years, the
market for ground handling services at EU airports has been
gradually opened up to competition, and full liberalisation
was achieved by December 2003. Furthermore, the
Commission launched a review process of the ground-
handling operations markets in 2003, taking into account the
experiences so far.24
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A 1999 report by the European Commission on
changes in the European airline industry found
that in 1997, the study’s reference year, more
than 90% of EU air routes were still
monopolistic or duopolistic. This was broadly
confirmed in a 2000 report by the OECD.37 For
many routes this apparent lack of effective
competition can be explained by the limited
market volume, which allows only one or two
airlines to operate profitably. More recently,
developments regarding the level of
competition in this sector appear to go in
opposite directions. On the one hand, the recent
growth of low-cost carriers appears to have
substantially increased the level of competition
in the industry, often by providing alternative
routes at substantially lower prices than those
of established carriers.38 Furthermore, some
industry analysts argue that ticket sales via the
Internet have further increased the level of
competition in the EU air transport industry.
On the other hand, the increasing importance of
airline alliances is perceived to be having a
negative impact on effective competition.
An overall judgement of how successful
regulatory reforms in this field have been at
cultivating effective competition is difficult,
although the recent financial pressure on many
airlines in the EU (and beyond) suggests that
competition has on balance intensified.
However, addressing the above-mentioned
competition bottlenecks in some segments of
the airline industry is clearly a priority for
further action.
3.4 POSTAL SERVICES
The following two sub-sections deal with two
industries which are in even earlier stages of
the regulatory reform process than the sectors
discussed above, namely the postal sector and
the rail transport industry.
The postal sector falls into two parts. Parcel
and express services operate in a broadly
competitive environment, whereas mail
services in most Member States are still highly
regulated. The first so-called Postal Services
Directive (97/67/EC) opened only about 3% of
the regulated national mail services markets to
competition. The new Postal Services
Directive adopted in 2002 defined further steps
in the market opening process. More
specifically, Member States must open up the
following market segments to competition:
– From 2003: delivery of letters weighing
more than 100gr (or costing more than three
times the price of a standard letter) and all
outgoing cross-border mail.39
– From 2006: delivery of letters weighing
more than 50gr (or costing more than two
and a half times the price of a standard
letter).
Taken together, these segments represent
roughly 20% of the overall postal sector.
Furthermore, the new Postal Services Directive
requires the Commission to complete in the
course of 2006 a study assessing, for each
Member State, the impact of a full Internal
Market for postal services in 2009 on universal
service. On the basis of that study, the
Commission will make a proposal confirming,
if appropriate the aim of a full Internal Market
for postal services in 2009 or determine any
other step.
The European Commission recently assessed
the impact of the 1997 Postal Directive and
concluded that the Directive has been correctly
implemented in the majority of Member States
and that the quality of postal services has
generally improved.40 The experience of those
37 Gonenc and Nicoletti (2000). For further details on this issue
see Chapter 3.
38 Most low-cost carriers provide services to and from secondary
airports located close to major primary airports. These new
connections are often close substitutes to existing services
between primary airports, thus exerting downward price
pressure on existing services (see e.g. European Commission,
2003, or “Airlines under siege” in: The Economist, 27 March
2004).
39 Member States that need the revenue from this market
segment in order to continue providing their universal service
could reserve it.
40 However, the European Commission initiated in 2003
procedures against Greece, France and Austria for failing to
implement the 2002 Postal Services Directive.25
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Member States that liberalised their postal
markets beyond the minimum requirements, for
example Germany, the Netherlands and
Sweden, appears to have been broadly positive.
Increased competition led to substantial price
reductions in the parcel post, bulk and direct
mail markets, which resulted mainly in direct
benefits for producers. Front-runners in postal
liberalisation did not experience problems in
the provision of universal services, even in
remote areas with low population density.
3.5 RAIL TRANSPORT
Regulatory reforms in the rail transport
industry are still in the early stages. In
February 2001, the “First railway package”
was adopted. The main purpose of this first
package was to establish some preconditions
for the provision of competing services on the
European rail freight transport market. More
specifically, the package called for:
– The separation of essential functions of the
railway industry, such as the (bottleneck)
infrastructure management and the actual
rail services.
– The establishment of an independent rail
regulator in each Member State.
– A reduction of the technical barriers
between the different national rail networks
in order to facilitate the provision of cross-
border services.
– A gradual opening of the European rail
freight network to all licensed rail
operators. Seven years after the entry into
force of the Council Directive, operators
will have access to the whole rail network
for international rail freight transport.
In early 2004 an agreement was reached on the
“Second rail package” proposed by the
European Commission in 2002. This second
package foresees that the international rail
freight market in the EU will be fully opened to
competition by January 2006 and for all
domestic freight services across the EU
(cabotage) in 2007. Furthermore, the
agreement envisages opening up international
passenger traffic by 2010. This issue is part of
the “Third railway package”, which is already
being discussed. Proposals to liberalise
national passenger services are expected at a
later date.
All in all, competition in railway transport is
still in its early stages, but at the EU level there
is clear legislative progress in the field.
However, a recent study commissioned by the
German operator Deutsche Bahn on barriers in
the European railway market suggests great
disparity in the Member States’ regulatory
reform processes.41 IBM has developed a
“Liberalisation Index” of the EU15 Member
States that places them into one of three
categories (‘On Schedule’, ‘Delayed’ and
‘Pending Departure’) according to the
openness of their markets. Only five countries
– Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK – are in the ‘On Schedule’
group and are considered to have made
considerable progress in opening up their
markets.
Different surveys amongst EU citizens suggest
that consumer satisfaction is relatively lower in
the railways sector than in other network
industries (see European Commission 2004b).
4 PRICE DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED
NETWORK INDUSTRIES
As mentioned in Section 2, a number of recent
studies indicate that regulatory reforms in
network industries could trigger downward
price effects in these sectors42. In this section,
we analyse the presence of such effects in four
selected European network industries:
telecommunications, electricity, gas and
airlines. Section 4.1 deals with the recent price
41 IBM (2003).
42 For a recent discussion see also European Commission
(2004c).26
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developments in these sectors. Section 4.2
presents the degree of price dispersion in
telecommunications, electricity and gas. Using
panel data econometrics, Section 4.3 explores
how regulatory differences could account for
the considerable variation in the level of
telecommunications, electricity and gas prices
across the EU. Section 4.4 looks at price
developments and price level determinants in
the EU airline industry.
4.1 RECENT PRICE DEVELOPMENTS IN
SELECTED NETWORK INDUSTRIES
As argued above, regulatory reforms in most
network industries resulted in downward price
effects in these sectors. Chart 4 shows the
development of the EU 15 HICP sub-indices
for electricity, gas, telecommunications and air
passenger transportation during the period
from January 1998 to February 2005 relative to
changes in the overall EU 15 HICP.
With regard to the telecommunications sub-
index, a marked downward trend compared
with the overall HICP is apparent since 1998.
Overall, from January 1998 to February 2005
consumer telecommunications prices in the EU
fell by 30.0% relative to the EU HICP. The
electricity sub-index also shows a downward
trend. However, it is clearly weaker than that of
telecommunications and was interrupted on
several occasions, due to either increases in
energy taxation or higher oil prices. Between
January 1998 and February 2005 the electricity
price index for the EU fell by 1.6% relative to
the overall EU HICP. By contrast, the gas price
sub-index rose by 17.1% relative to overall EU
HICP over the same period. This increase is
concentrated over the pre-deregulation period
(January 1998 to November 2001), with the gas
price sub-index rising by 12.1% over that
period. Since then, gas prices have been
moving downwards, although, as is the case
with electricity, oil price hikes interrupted the
trend towards the end of the period. The HICP
sub-index for air passenger transportation
increased by 6.4% relative to total HICP in the
period January 1998 to February 2005.
Whereas this suggests that the market’s
liberalisation has not yet provided tangible
benefits for consumers at the aggregate level, a
closer analysis of disaggregated data (see
Section 4.4) is needed in order to disentangle
the effects of market opening on different
segments of the air transport market.
In sum, Chart 4 suggests some causality
between market opening and relative price
falls, at least in some of the sectors under
review. However, it is important to keep in
mind that regulatory reforms are only one of the
many factors determining price developments
in these industries. Other important elements
may include technological progress (especially
in the case of telecommunications), tax
changes and oil price changes (in the case of
electricity, gas and air transport).




Regulatory reforms are likely to have an impact
on international price level differences in
network industries. As argued in Sections 1 and
Chart 4 Electricity, gas, telecommunications, and air
passenger transportation price indices relative to the
overall Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices in the EU15
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2, increased domestic competition is expected
to reduce profit margins and bring prices
increasingly in line with costs. Furthermore,
creating a single EU market for
telecommunications, electricity and gas is
likely to increase international competition,
thereby potentially reducing price differentials
across countries. However, notwithstanding
the evidence of a downward trend in
telecommunications and electricity prices,
Telecommunications 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
Local Call Average 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12
Coeff of Variation 20.81 26.14 27.55 41.61 42.71 30.21 35.85 39.48
Max/Min. Ratio 2.00 2.38 3.17 6.50 6.25 4.67 5.50 5.25
Long Average 0.22 0.24 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.76 0.78
Distance Coeff of Variation 42.67 47.29 44.23 57.53 54.70 53.81 55.15 55.47
Max/Min. Ratio 4.38 6.00 5.18 7.64 8.00 8.82 9.31 9.62
International Average 0.70 0.75 0.99 1.17 1.26 1.41 1.77 1.77
Coeff of Variation 40.39 36.93 24.88 17.54 15.15 11.06 14.75 15.98
Max/Min. Ratio 3.68 3.82 2.49 2.07 1.80 1.54 1.96 1.99
Mobile Average 0.45 0.48 0.57 0.66 0.81 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Coeff of Variation 35.96 41.22 44.80 37.65 31.09 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Max/Min. Ratio 4.22 4.78 5.83 5.50 3.10 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Electricity
Small Average 6.51 6.24 6.14 6.63 6.68 6.72 6.77 6.93 6.63
Households Coeff of Variation 14.84 16.75 18.48 17.41 17.09 16.95 17.14 19.08 18.75
Max/Min. Ratio 1.76 1.93 2.08 1.99 2.02 1.95 1.91 1.85 1.94
Large Average 15.28 14.62 13.99 16.00 15.83 16.14 16.23 16.42 16.68
Households Coeff of Variation 29.77 28.38 27.63 29.07 29.59 29.71 29.17 30.15 31.29
Max/Min. Ratio 2.87 2.87 2.87 3.34 4.67 4.72 4.82 4.53 4.40
Small Average 9.86 9.70 10.16 11.96 12.63 12.83 13.19 13.49 14.20
Industrial Coeff of Variation 29.20 31.27 29.32 27.49 27.82 26.54 25.93 26.43 25.66
Max/Min. Ratio 2.46 3.80 3.39 2.68 2.98 2.82 2.83 2.72 3.16
Large Average 6.18 6.01 6.00 6.15 6.61 6.85 7.06 7.14 7.62
Industrial Coeff of Variation 29.16 29.89 29.37 23.38 22.05 20.38 19.66 19.34 18.41
Max/Min. Ratio 3.38 3.49 3.25 2.73 2.58 2.32 2.14 2.20 2.17
Gas
Small Average 15.29 14.64 14.70 13.30 12.29 12.60 12.77 12.40 12.73
Households Coeff of Variation 15.93 14.17 14.35 17.27 19.44 20.59 22.19 22.20 21.22
Max/Min. Ratio 1.86 1.66 1.72 1.91 2.10 2.16 2.28 2.03 1.84
Large Average 8.63 8.40 8.53 7.43 6.58 6.99 7.18 6.89 6.62
Households Coeff of Variation 19.08 20.21 18.71 17.45 17.00 15.00 15.44 18.03 16.62
Max/Min. Ratio 2.01 1.92 1.73 1.70 1.66 1.59 1.55 1.75 1.69
Small Average 6.61 6.56 7.04 5.77 4.68 5.12 5.51 5.13 4.97
Industrial Coeff of Variation 17.10 14.73 20.40 16.18 16.72 14.41 18.02 22.93 17.39
Max/Min. Ratio 1.79 1.71 2.02 1.85 1.89 1.72 2.22 2.87 1.98
Large Average 5.31 5.06 5.70 4.42 3.17 3.53 3.75 3.44 3.40
Industrial Coeff of Variation 14.31 13.04 17.21 13.85 13.79 15.70 16.20 17.34 12.72
Max/Min. Ratio 1.70 1.54 1.83 1.65 1.61 1.67 1.69 1.95 1.50
Table 4 Telecommunications price level differences in the EU15 1995-2002 1), 2)
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
1) Average prices are weighted by the EU Member States’ shares in the relevant HICP sub-indices. Taxes are not included.
2) Electricity consumers definitions: Small-scale households = 600 kWh p.a.; large-scale households = 2. GwH p.a.; small-scale
industry = 3 GwH. p.a. and large-scale industry = 10 GwH p.a
2) Gas consumers definitions: Small-scale households = 8.37 GJ p.a.; large-scale households = 1,047. GJ p.a.; small-scale industry
= 418.6 GJ p.a. and large-scale industry = 41,860 GJ p.a.
Table 4 shows that there are still marked price
level differences in these sectors, both between
EU Member States and between various types
of users.
Table 4 shows that in 2002 the ratio of the
highest to the lowest price level for
telecommunications services in the EU
(maximum / minimum ratio) ranged between
2.0 for local calls and 4.4 for long distance28
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calls. For electricity (in 2003), the variations
are broadly similar. Here the ratio of maximum
to minimum prices varies between 1.8 for small
households and 3.4 for large industrial users.
For gas (2003), the ratio of maximum to
minimum prices is somewhat lower, ranging
between 1.7 and 2.0.
Price dispersion, as measured by the
coefficient of variation of prices (excluding
taxes) ranged between 21% and 43% in 2002
for different types of telecommunications
services, between 15% and 30% for different
types of electricity users (in 2003) and between
14% and 19% in the case of gas users (in 2003).
It is worth noting that, except for gas users, this
clearly exceeds the coefficient of variation of
price levels for total private final consumption
of goods and services reported by Eurostat.43
Looking at changes over time, the price level
dispersion in these sectors appears to be fairly
stable for the period 1995-2002/3, except for
fixed-line telecommunication services and
large-scale industrial electricity users.
Whereas the coefficient of variation dropped
by 13 and 16 percentage points for local and
long distance calls respectively between 1999
and 2000, there has been a gradual increase in
the coefficient of variation for international
calls and large-scale industrial electricity users
over the same time period. Regarding fixed-
line international calls, this can mainly be
attributed to the fact that, while prices fell over
that period in all countries except the UK, the
magnitude of price falls differed significantly
among Member States. Furthermore, the
largest falls occurred in those countries that
already had below-average international call
prices in 1995. As regards large-scale
industrial electricity users, the increase in price
dispersion over the past years can be explained
by the different speeds at which regulatory
reform measures in this sector have been
implemented across EU countries.
Regarding the various types of users or
services, the price level differences are even
more striking. On average, international calls
in the EU are more than seven times as
expensive as local calls and large domestic
electricity/small domestic gas consumers pay
about two and a half times as much as large
industrial electricity/gas users. Differences of
this magnitude are unlikely to be caused
entirely by cost differentials and indicate
substantial differences in the level of
competition in the various market segments.





Against the background of large and persistent
price differences in the European
telecommunications, electricity, gas and air
transport industries, it is important to analyse
the price level determinants in these sectors.
Such an analysis allows a quantitative
assessment of the importance of policy
variables for price level differences and
permits an evaluation of the likely degree of
persistence of these differences over the
coming years. To this end, the prices of
different types of electricity, gas or
telecommunication services are regressed
against a number of potential explanatory
variables in a panel data setting.43
For telecommunications, annual average prices
for a 3-minute call at peak time for four
different types of services (local calls, long
distance calls, international calls and mobile
calls) for the period 1994 to 2001 are regressed
43 Using panel data increases the number of available
observations, which is likely to produce more reliable
parameter estimates and enables the specification and testing
of more sophisticated models, incorporating less restrictive
behavioural assumptions.29
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against the following five explanatory
variables44:
– Liberalisation variables (de jure). A first
variable, years since liberalisation, takes
the value of the number of years since
liberalisation if liberalisation has taken
place, and zero prior to legal liberalisation.
A second variable, an impulse dummy,
takes the value 1 before liberalisation and
zero afterwards.
– The percentage of the incumbent firm’s
shares that are still publicly owned.
– A dummy for the presence of number
portability.45
– The price of leased lines (i.e. the
infrastructure the operator has to lease / rent
in order to be able to offer the specific
telecommunication service).
– The existence of ‘carrier-select facilities’,
allowing consumers to choose operators on
a call-by-call basis, using a special access
code.
– The number of firms operating or disposing
of a license in the specific market segment.
– The total amount of telecommunication
investment in each country for each year46.
For electricity, semi-annual prices for the
available four different types of consumers
(two types of households and two types of
industrial users) for the period 1990 to 2003 are
estimated against five variables, of which the
first two (the de jure liberalisation variable and
the percentage of public ownership of the
incumbent) are identical to the variables used
for telecommunications. Furthermore, three
electricity-specific variables are included,
namely: 47
– The price of gas.
– The percentage of electricity generated by
gas.
– The concentration in the electricity
generation market (measured by the market
share of the three biggest companies).
For gas, semi-annual prices for four different
types of consumers for the period 2000 to 2003
are estimated against five variables, of which
the first two are identical to the variables used
for telecommunications. Furthermore, three
gas-specific variables are included, namely
– The price of oil.
– An estimate of the unit costs of gas
transportation over 100 km.
– A dummy indicating whether third party
network access is granted on a regulated
(rather than negotiated) basis.
It seemed appropriate to test for the inclusion
of two different liberalisation-related variables
for all industries because the implementation
of regulatory reforms and the creation of de
facto competition take a number of years, even
if specific deadlines call for a complete market
opening in a particular year. Besides those
gradual effects, however, it can be assumed
that one-off (permanent) price effects will
occur once the markets are opened for
competition. The first liberalisation variable,
taking the value of the number of years since
liberalisation and zero prior to legal
liberalisation, is suitable for capturing possible
gradual price effects of implementing
regulatory reforms. The second variable,
taking a value of 1 prior to the legal market
opening, is designed to capture the one-off
effects of the introduction of competition.
44 All telecommunication price data are provided by the European
Commission and can be found at http://www.ispo.cec.be/
infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Study-en.htm. Data for mobile
telephone services were only available from 1998 onwards.
Data on the other explanatory variables are obtained either from
the European Commission, The OECD or from NRAs. Other
explanatory variables such as a dummy variable for the year in
which Member States opened their market for competition, the
rental charge, the presence of carrier selection and the number
of firms operating or disposing of a license in the specific
market segment have also been included in the regressions but
were never found to be significant.
45 Number portability indicates that switching telephone
operators does not imply a change in the phone number.
46 As investment data is rather volatile across the years, a third
order polynomial was fitted to investment data per country
over the sample period 1980-2001. The resulting data for the
period 1994-2001 was then used in the regressions.
47 As in the case of telecommunications, more explanatory
variables have been tested, such as the percentage of oil,
hydro-power and nuclear power in the production structure,
investment in the electricity generation segment and the
concentration and the number of generators in the market.
None of them was significant. Electricity and gas price data
are obtained from Eurostat’s New Chronos database. Given
that observations are semestrial, the prices have been adjusted
by using the moving average method. Data related to the other
explanatory variables are obtained from NRAs.30
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It should be kept in mind that the ‘gradual’
liberalisation variable has the features of a time
trend for the period after deregulation is
implemented and that during the last decade
technological progress was substantial,
particularly in the telecommunications
industry. Since it is not possible to disentangle
the gradual liberalisation effects from other
effects (such as inter alia technological
progress48), some caution in the interpretation
of the results for this variable is warranted. As a
robustness check, the inclusion of these two
liberalisation variables was compared with an
alternative model making use of only one
variable, namely the number of years prior to/
following (de jure) liberalisation. Prior to
liberalisation, the number becomes negative,
after liberalisation it turns positive. A non-
nested F-test was used to obtain the most
appropriate specification for each regression.
Telecommunications Local call Long distance call International call Mobile call
Years since liberalisation -2.70%2) n.s. -12.41%2) n.s.
Pre-liberalisation dummy 12.65%2) 12.45%1) 6.31%1) n.a.
Increase in the number of competitors n.s. -0.15%1) n.s. n.s.
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -2.41%1) -8.34%2) -3.14%2) -0.54%1)
Introducing number portability n.s. n.s. -19.92%2) n.s.
Introducing carrier pre-selection n.s. -2.92%2) n.s. n.s.
Increasing the connection charge by 10% 0.06%2) 0.00%1) n.s. n.s.
Increasing price of leased lines by 10% 0.06%2) 0.81%2) n.s. n.s.
Increasing investment by 10%  n.s. -1.27%2) -0.34%1) -1.53%2)
R2 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.86
Durbin-Watson test 1.99 1.99 1.96 2.00
Electricity Small households Large households Small industrial Large industrial
Advancing one year in liberalisation n.s. -0.35%2) -2.08%1) -1.03%2)
Reduction of market concentration n.s. -3.83%1) -14.69%2) n.s.
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -1.53%1) n.s. -2.23%1) -2.36%1)
A fall of 1% in the gas price -1.01%2) -1.12%2) -2.34%2) -5.49%2)
R2 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.92
Durbin-Watson test 1.92 1.99 1.89 1.94
Gas Small households Large households Small industrial Large industrial
Advancing one year in liberalisation -2.80%2) -1.84%2) -1.64%2) -4.23%2)
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -0.34%2) -0.77%2) -6.82%2) -6.94%2)
Regulated access dummy -11.75%2) -4.39%2) n.s. n.s.
Decreasing the transmission cost by 10% -1.56%2) -3.55%2) -0.36%2) -0.47%2)
A fall of 10% in the oil price -1.68%1) -2.66%2) -3.19%2) -4.75%2)
R2 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.97
Durbin-Watson test 1.99 1.95 2.01 1.88
Table 5 Estimation results for the determinants of price levels
1) Significance at the 5% level
2) Significance at the 1% level
n.s. not significant
n.a. not applicable
For telecommunications, the model using both
the gradual and one-off liberalisation variables
was superior to the model with the ‘number of
years prior/since liberalisation’ variable only.
For gas and electricity, the second model was
always superior and was used in the
estimations.
The results of the estimates for the three
industries are summarised in Table 5.49
48 Although for telecommunications, technological progress
should be captured by the telecommunications investment
variable.
49 Fixed-effects models were used in order to make inferences
conditional on the effects that are in the sample. The country
fixed effects were never significant. However, they were not
omitted from the regression equations because they are likely
to have an impact on price levels across the EU and they do not
bias the results. Non-linearity tests for all coefficients were
insignificant. Unit root and Durbin-Watson tests were
computed on the balanced part of the panel and behaved well
in all instances.31
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For telecommunications, Table 5 indicates that
advancing one year in the liberalisation process
results in a yearly nominal price fall of around
12.4% for international calls. Such price falls
are quite substantial and may partly be caused
by tariff rebalancing between the international
segments of the telecommunications market
and the (still less competitive) local call
segment, where prices in the years following
liberalisation have only fallen by 2.7% on
average.
The ‘pre-liberalisation’ dummy variable is
significant for all fixed-line calls, with the
results suggesting one-off price falls of
between 6% and 13% due to the legal opening
of the market. The importance of the
introduction of competition is further reflected
in the significant, albeit limited, price effect of
around 0.2% of an extra competitor in the long
distance market segments. When interpreting
the estimation results for these three variables,
it is important to keep in mind that prior to the
regulatory reform process cross subsidisation
had especially lifted prices for international
and long distance fixed-line calls substantially
above costs. These segments of the market thus
offered good opportunities for new entrants to
compete with the incumbents. In the local
market segment, by contrast, such
opportunities were scarcer, so a legal
introduction of market competition led to more
tepid price responses.
Looking at some more specific regulatory
reform variables for the telecommunications
industry, the results indicate that privatisation
triggers significant price falls for international
(-3.1%), long distance (-8.3%) and local call
services (-2.4%)50. For mobile telephone
services, the impact of privatisation is minor
and only weakly significant. This can be
attributed to the fact that most incumbent
mobile phone operators were either already
privatised by the start of the sample period
(1998) or, given the stronger competitive
pressure in mobile telephony, were forced to
behave as a privately owned company51.
The presence of carrier pre-selection and the
introduction of number portability also appear
to result in significant price falls, but only for
specific types of services. By contrast,
increasing the price of leased lines (and to a
lesser extent the connection charge) appears to
have a significant upward impact on the price
of both local and long distance call services.
This highlights the importance of a regulatory
framework that ensures that incumbent
operators do not overcharge for access to the
network infrastructure.
Finally, total investment in the
telecommunication industry (which could be
seen as a proxy for technological progress in
this sector) turns out to be an important
explanatory variable for long distance,
international and mobile phone call services,
suggesting price falls of between 0.3% and
1.5% if telecommunication investment is
increased by 10%. These results confirm the
importance of technological progress for price
developments in the telecommunication sector
over the past decade. Moreover, in the case of
international call services, this variable is
strongly correlated with the number of
competitors in the market. This may imply that
more competition in this market segment has in
fact triggered higher investment. This confirms
the finding of Alesina et al. (2005) that
reducing barriers to entry actually spurs
investment in OECD countries. One
implication for our set-up is that part of the
investment-induced price falls we find in the
international call segment are in fact caused by
50 From a static perspective, economic theory is generally
agnostic as to whether private ownership is superior in
efficiency terms compared with public ownership (see e.g.
Laffont and Tirole, 1993). From a dynamic perspective,
however, private ownership is generally considered more
efficient than public ownership. The threat of takeover for
example provides a very powerful efficiency incentive and
private companies are no longer in a privileged position vis-à-
vis the government when asking for public support. This view
is also supported by other empirical studies such as Good,
Röller and Sickles (1993) and Galal, Jones, Tandon, Vogelsang
(1994).
51 Results for mobile telephone services should be treated with
caution given the limited number of available observations
compared with the other types of telecommunication services.32
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the introduction of more competition and thus
by deregulation.
For the electricity sector, advancing one year in
the liberalisation process yields price
reductions in the range of 0.4% to 2.1% for
most types of users, but it is not significant for
small households. There are several reasons for
the differences in magnitude compared with the
findings in the telecommunications sector.
First, as argued above, this variable probably
also captures the impact of technological
advancements in the sector concerned. Such
advancements were much stronger in
telecommunications than in the electricity
sector. Second, regulatory reform in electricity
has in most Member States started more
recently, especially for households. During
most of the 1990-2003 sample period, the
gradual effects of regulatory reform were
therefore not yet particularly present.
Reducing market concentration, an indicator of
the  de facto level of competition in the
industry, does have significant effects in both
the large household and small industrial
electricity sector, with prices falling by almost
15% for small industrial users and by almost
4% for large households.
Reducing public ownership in electricity
companies appears to have significant
downward price effects for three types of
electricity users, ranging from 1.5% for small
household electricity consumers to 2.4% for
large industrial users. Gas prices play a key
role in determining electricity prices, with a
1% fall in the gas price leading to a price fall of
between 1% and 5.5% for electricity users.
Gas prices are also significantly influenced by
regulatory reforms and privatisation. More
specifically, advancing one year in the
deregulation process induces price falls
between 1.8% and 4.2%. Further, a decrease in
public ownership reduces gas prices, in
particular for industrial consumers (by almost
7%), while for households the reductions are
more limited (between 0.3% and 0.8%). The
usage costs of the transmission network are an
important determinant of gas price
developments and network access on a
regulated, rather than negotiated, basis appears
to result in further significant price reductions
for households. Finally, the results show that
gas prices are strongly linked to oil prices. This
is to a large extent technologically determined,
as gas is often extracted as a side product of oil
extraction and many European gas contracts
are to date still linked to oil price
developments.52
4.3.2 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF FURTHER
REGULATORY REFORM ON PRICE LEVELS
AND PRICE CONVERGENCE
Based on the findings reported above, it is
possible to derive mechanically how current
prices would change if a number of regulatory
reform variables were adjusted so as to reflect
international ‘best practice’.
For telecommunications such a ‘best practice’
scenario assumes that public ownership is
abandoned completely, leased line prices and
connection charges converge to the lowest
current level in the EU and the number of
competitors in each country equals that of the
country that currently has the highest number
of competitors (currently the UK). Taken
together, these four measures would reduce the
EU price level for local calls by 28%, for long
distance calls by 0.2% and for international
calls by 27%, with most of the price effects
coming from the convergence of leased line
prices and connection charges (see Table 6).
The ‘advancing one year in liberalisation’
variable has not been included in these
simulations, as it is unclear to what extent these
effects will persist over the years to come.
Carrier pre-selection and number portability
have been completely implemented in the
market segments where they have a significant
impact, so they cannot be expected to have any
further price impact.
52 However, gas is also (particularly in the industrial sector) a
competing input to oil.33
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Performing the same exercise for electricity
implies that all countries move towards full
privatisation and have had 5 years of market
liberalisation behind them, and that
competition in the electricity generation
converges to the country with the highest level
of competition (currently the UK).
Furthermore, it is assumed that gas prices in the
EU converge to the EU minimum, although this
assumption is rather strong, at least in the short
run.53 Gas price convergence towards the
lowest European level should thus be seen as an
illustration of the potential downward price
effect of a fully integrated European gas market
rather than a likely short-run prospect.
The combined effect of the three regulatory
reform measures outlined above would lower
electricity prices between 17% and 30% for the
different types of consumers with the strongest
impact coming from the convergence of gas
prices (see Table 6).
Finally, a similar exercise for gas prices
reveals that the total impact of further progress
with regulatory reform could be of comparable
magnitude to that in the electricity and
telecommunications sectors. The convergence
of transport costs is the main factor inducing
price reductions. Oil prices are fairly
homogenous across countries.
4.4 PRICE DEVELOPMENTS AND PRICE LEVEL
DETERMINANTS DURING THE 1992-2001
PERIOD FOR THE EU AIR TRANSPORT
INDUSTRY
The European air transport industry is an
interesting example of a network industry
where regulatory reform measures designed to
increase the level of competition have become
‘mature’. More specifically, the current
Telecommunications Local call Long distance call International call Mobile call
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -0.59 -0.18 -7.93 -0.05
Convergence of number of competitors -0.65 - 0 -
Introducing number portability - 0 - -
Introducing carrier pre-selection 0.00 - - -
Convergence of connection charges -0.04 -  -0.28 -
Convergence of prices for leased lines -26.66 - -18.69 -
Joint potential total impact -27.93 -0.18 -26.90 -0.05
Electricity Small households Large households Small industrial Large industrial
Liberalisation has been introduced
for 5 years - -0.99 -6.47 1.38
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -7.08 - -0.02 -1.27
Convergence of market concentration - -1.342 -11.15 -
Gas price convergence -14.99 -14.17 -11.91 -19.59
Joint potential total impact -22.07 -16.50 -29.55 -22.25
Gas Small households Large households Small industrial Large industrial
Liberalisation has been introduced
for 5 years -11.43 -4.59 -5.08 -3.36
Decreasing public ownership by 10% -0.15 -0.36 -0.04 -3.96
Legal liberalisation -2.38 -1.37 -1.21 -
Introducing regulated line access -1.00 -0.39 - -
Transport cost convergence -8.23 -19.28 -21.77 -28.61
Joint potential total impact -23.19 -25.98 -28.09 -35.93
Table 6 The potential future impact of the different determinants on electricity,
telecommunications and gas prices
53 Gas prices are currently still diverse across the European
Union, mainly due to country specific gas policies, resulting
inter alia from and in the selection of different suppliers (e.g.
Russia, Algeria, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK) with
different price levels. Producer-distributor relationships in
the gas market are usually based on long-term contracts and
changing suppliers involves considerable technical obstacles.
Besides, tax policies in the gas market differ significantly
among the Member States, making gas in some countries
much more expensive than in others. A good example in this
respect is the recent introduction of an ecotax in the
Netherlands, resulting in a substantial increase in gas prices
and hence also electricity prices.34
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x-axis: Percentage of Routes with more than one airline
y-axis: Average fare per km
regulatory regime gives unrestricted access to
all international intra-Community routes and
all domestic markets for any carrier holding a
Community licence. The effects of this
deregulation are reflected, for instance, in the
number of routes operated. The number of
international routes linking EU Member States
has steadily increased, from 1,368 in 1992 to
2,120 in 1997 and 2,313 in 2000. Moreover, the
deregulation has led to increased competition.
In 2000, 892 routes were served by two carriers
or more, compared with 779 in 1997 and 625 in
1992.
However, a number of important elements in
the ‘air transport production chain’ such as
airport slot allocation and ground handling
operations are still heavily regulated (see
Section 3.3). This is likely to have a dampening
effect on the de facto level of competition.
Furthermore, many loss-making EU airlines
are still at least partly state-owned and
subsidised, which prevents unprofitable
companies from exiting the market. Given that
these aspects of air transport remain mainly
country-specific, a substantial degree of
national heterogeneity in EU air transport
markets endures.
This sub-section provides some stylised facts
and estimation results on developments in
international air transport services prices
within the EU between 1992 and 2001.54
The figures suggest a clear negative correlation
between prices and the level of competition for
business and full-fare economy class tickets,
with correlation coefficients of –0.52 and –
0.45 respectively. The correlation is somewhat
weaker for promotional air fares (-0.39). The
weaker link between prices for promotional
tickets and the number of carriers can be
explained by the fact that the carriers serving
the route tend to compete not only with other
scheduled carriers providing direct services but
also with charter and indirect services (for
which data are not available). Given the
considerable increase in total international
intra-EU routes between 1992 and 2000 this
form of (indirect) competition is likely to have
considerably increased, but it is not reflected in
Chart 5.
Developments of average fares per kilometre
over time depend strongly on the type of ticket.
The average fare per kilometre for business
class tickets on intra-EU international flights
has steadily increased from EUR 0.42 in 1992
to EUR 0.45 in 1997 and EUR 0.53 in 2000
Chart 5 Average fare per km and percentage
of routes with more than one carrier
(in EU15 Member States in 1992, 1997 and 2000)
54 The data source is a European Commission database
containing information on the air transport industry, such as
the number of scheduled flights, average ticket price and
various cost factors such as fuel costs and airport charges.35
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(Table 7). This contrasts with the development
in the average price for full-fare economy and
promotional tickets. The former increased
considerably between 1992 and 1997, but
subsequently declined to a level below the EU
average in 1992, and the latter has consistently
declined. In fact, the average promotional fare
per kilometre in 2000 was at less than 30% of
its level in 1992.
There are also considerable differences in the
air transport price levels of different EU
Member States. It is particularly interesting to
see that some peripheral Member States such as
Greece, Portugal and Finland had a particularly
low price level in 1992. This relative position
has in the meantime been partly eroded due to a
number of factors, such as the equalisation of
price levels as part of the general real economic
convergence process within the EU.
Furthermore, the European Commission has
taken an increasingly tough stance in granting
state aid to national airlines.
In order to test for the impact of regulatory
reforms and increased competition on the price
level in the airline industry, we perform a
similar exercise as presented in Section 4.3 for
telecommunications, gas and electricity. More
precisely, the prices of economy, business and
promotional tickets are regressed against a
number of potential explanatory variables in a
fixed-effects panel data setting for half-yearly
data over the period 1992 to 2001. The first two
variables below are related to deregulation; the
other variables are measures of the cost of
operating the aircraft:
– Liberalisation variable (de jure). This
variable takes the value of the number of
years after liberalisation has taken place,
and zero prior to legal liberalisation.
– The number of carriers operating on the
same line.
– The fuel costs to operate the aircraft.
– The distance of the flight.
– The average monthly lease cost in dollars of
the aircraft used.
The results of the estimations are summarised
in Table 8.
In line with expectations, the regression results
indicate that increases in fuel costs and in the
monthly lease cost of the aircraft augment the
airfare for all categories. The other variables
have differing impacts according to the class of
the ticket.
For business class tickets, prices have
increased since the market deregulation in
1992 1997 2000
Business 0.42 0.45 0.53
Economy 0.32 0.40 0.30
Promotional 0.20 0.17 0.14
Table 7 Average fare per km for intra-EU
international flights (in EUR)
Telecommunications Business Economy Promo
Years since liberalisation + - -
Increase in the number of competitors + n.s. -
Fuel costs + + +
Distance of the flight - - +
Monthly lease cost of the aircraft + + +
R2 0.93 0.93 0.94
Durbin-Watson test 1.97 1.85 2.01
Table 8 Estimation results for the determinants of price levels
Note: n.s. = not significant36
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55 On this issue see e.g. The Economist, “Special report: Low-
cost airlines”, 10 July 2004.
1993 (as is reflected by the positive coefficient
on the ‘years since liberalisation’ variable).
Moreover, increasing the number of
competitors on the same route has also had an
upward effect on prices. By contrast, for both
economy and promotional tickets, the years
following the 1993 market deregulation have
had a downward impact on prices. The
regression results suggest the presence of some
tariff rebalancing between the business and
economy/promotional class market segments.
For many routes, it is possible to ‘cross-
subsidise’ promotional tickets with higher
business class fares because competition in
business class is usually restricted to
companies that provide direct scheduled
flights. Competition tends to be stronger for
economy fares, especially promotional
economy fares, including indirect routes, in
particular for long-distance flights, and charter
services.
When interpreting these results, a number of
important caveats regarding the dataset should
be kept in mind. First, the data used for this
section includes only a limited number of
charter flights. Second, the latest available data
(i.e. summer 2001) does not capture the strong
recent increase in low-cost carriers. The rapid
expansion of this market segment during the
last few years is likely to exert downward
pressure on the industry as a whole, even
though these airlines frequently use secondary
airports, thus ‘indirectly’ increasing
competition on many routes.55 This is again
likely to have the strongest impact on the
economy and promotional segments of the air
transport market.
On most (direct) routes, the air transport
market is likely to remain at best oligopolistic
and thus a particularly challenging industry for
competition policy. This is further accentuated
by the increasing number of airline alliances,
which tend to preclude price competition
between ‘allied’ carriers on jointly serviced
routes.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory reforms in EU network industries
have made great strides forward in recent years,
although the network industries covered in this
paper are still in very different stages of the
regulatory reform process and the level of
competition differs significantly between
sectors.
Several empirical studies examined in this
paper provide quantitative evidence of the
sector-specific and economy-wide benefits of
regulatory reforms in network industries.
Economy-wide effects of regulatory reforms,
especially in terms of price level reductions
and (temporary) downward effects on inflation,
are particularly relevant for the conduct of
monetary policy. Even if the magnitude of the
effects differs significantly across countries
and industries and depends crucially on the
type of regulatory changes introduced, a
common pattern of empirical results emerges.
Increased competition (in terms of
liberalisation, privatisation, unbundling, etc.)
is generally associated with lower price levels,
expanded output and labour productivity gains.
However, regulatory reforms do have some
short-term costs, mainly in the form of initial
employment losses. The ultimate impact on
sector and aggregate employment depends on
the labour market’s ability to adjust to a
changing economic situation. Service quality
and the extent of R&D and innovation
expenditures appear also to be positively
linked to regulatory reforms. All in all, the
empirical results in the literature tend to
confirm that regulatory reforms in network
industries enhance consumer welfare.
From a legal point of view most of
these industries are now fully or largely
subject to competition. With regard to
telecommunications, regulators are gradually
adapting the current regulatory framework to
the new business environment by lessening37
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regulation where competition has emerged and
strengthening it where incumbents still retain a
dominant position. The regulatory reform
process in EU energy markets, however, is still
incomplete. First, the legal market opening
process will not be completed until 2007.
Second, many Member States’ current
regulatory framework still appears insufficient
to ensure a high level of actual competition in
legally open markets. The postal sector and the
rail transport industry are in even earlier stages
of the regulatory reform process than the EU
energy markets. By contrast, the provision of
air transport services in the EU is almost fully
liberalised, although the remaining
competition bottlenecks in some segments of
the airline industry clearly need to be
addressed.
Effective competition has also increased, but a
closer look at the implementation of the various
regulatory reforms shows that there are still a
number of unresolved issues at both the
national and EU levels. Generally speaking,
the experience of EU network industries
demonstrates that  an appropriate regulatory
framework is indispensable in order to create
de facto competition in these sectors, even after
markets have become legally open. In other
words, the ‘quality’ of the regulatory
framework has a considerable impact on the
extent to which regulatory reforms in network
industries will result in price falls and other
positive economic effects. An important EU-
specific issue is the continued national
fragmentation of network industry markets, for
example with regard to the physical
interconnections between energy and transport
networks. This prevents the creation of a truly
European market and hampers effective
competition, at least in some network
industries.
Recent changes in the HICP sub-indices for
network industries relative to the
developments in the overall HICP, in particular
for electricity and telecommunications, clearly
suggest that the introduction of competition in
these sectors led to significant relative price
falls.
Panel data estimations carried-out in this paper
provide additional evidence that regulatory
reform measures had a substantial downward
impact on prices in the four sectors under
review. Especially in telecommunications,
different explanatory variables that were used
to capture the impact of regulatory reforms on
prices turn out to be strongly significant. The
same is true for gas users, although the
magnitude of the impact is smaller than in the
case of telecommunications. With regard to the
electricity sector, regulatory reform measures
appear to have a strongly significant impact on
prices for industrial electricity users and large
households. Electricity prices for small private
households appear to be driven mainly by
fluctuations in input prices rather than
regulatory reforms. However, it should be kept
in mind that by the end of the sample period, the
market for domestic electricity users in most
EU Member States was not yet completely
opened up to competition. For air transport, the
analysis conducted in the paper shows an
increase in the number of international routes
operated within the EU and suggests that prices
of promotional and economy class tickets have
fallen due to regulatory reforms and the
resulting increase in competition. Prices for
business class tickets, however, have tended to
increase since the start of liberalisation, most
likely due to a rebalancing of ticket prices
across different market segments of the market.
On the basis of these empirical results, it is
estimated that further progress with regulatory
reforms in telecommunications, gas and
electricity, together with some degree of input
price convergence, would result in further
substantial price falls in EU network industries
of up to 36%.38
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